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Abstract—In this paper, the impact of multiple active eaves-
droppers on cooperative single carrier systems with multiple
relays and multiple destinations is examined. To achieve the
secrecy diversity gains in the form of opportunistic selection,
a two-stage scheme is proposed for joint relay and destination
selection, in which, after the selection of the relay with the mini-
mum effective maximum signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) to a cluster
of eavesdroppers, the destination that has the maximum SNR
from the chosen relay is selected. In order to accurately assess
the secrecy performance, the exact and asymptotic expressions
are obtained in closed-form for several security metrics including
the secrecy outage probability, the probability of non-zero secrecy
rate, and the ergodic secrecy rate in frequency selective fading.
Based on the asymptotic analysis, key design parameters such as
secrecy diversity gain, secrecy array gain, secrecy multiplexing
gain, and power cost are characterized, from which new insights
are drawn. Moreover, it is concluded that secrecy performance
limits occur when the average received power at the eavesdropper
is proportional to the counterpart at the destination. Specifically,
for the secrecy outage probability, we confirm that the secrecy
diversity gain collapses to zero with outage floor. For the ergodic
secrecy rate, we confirm that its slope collapses to zero with
capacity ceiling.
Index Terms—Cooperative transmission, frequency selective
fading, physical layer security, secrecy ergodic rate, secrecy
outage probability, single carrier transmission.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the broadcast nature of wireless channels and the
emergence of smart cities and the Internet of Things (IoT) in
the digital economy, the wireless infrastructure is continuously
being exposed to security threats of eavesdropping that may
potentially intercept or interrupt the communication between
the legitimate terminals. As such, security and privacy are
of utmost concern for future wireless technologies. Security
was originally implemented as a high-layer problem to be
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solved using cryptographic methods. However, in some net-
work architectures, such cryptographic security is practically
infeasible due to high complexity in data encryption and
decryption and the distributed nature of the infrastructure.
Alternatively, in wireless physical (PHY) layer security, the
breakthrough idea is to exploit the characteristics of wireless
channels such as fading or noise to transmit a message
from a source to an intended destination while keeping the
message confidential from passive eavesdroppers [1]. Different
from cryptographic methods, where the eavesdroppers can
intercept the information exchange and then try to decrypt the
cryptographic protection by quantum computer, the main idea
of PHY layer security is to exploit the uncorrelated nature of
the wireless medium with the aim to maximize the uncertainty
of the legitimate information at the eavesdropper.
It is not until recent years that the concept of PHY layer se-
curity has attracted considerable interest amongst wireless net-
work designers and marked widespread adoption in the study
of information security for radio communication systems. The
key idea is to degrade the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of
the eavesdropper relative to the legitimate receiver. This will
guarantee perfect secrecy in wiretap channels. Driven by this
and with the aid of multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO)
technology, PHY layer security in MIMO wiretap channels
that employ multiple colocated antennas at the transmitter, the
legitimate receiver, and/or the eavesdropper has attracted con-
siderable attention (e.g., [2]–[7], and the references therein).
Maximal ratio combining (MRC) for security enhancement
was proposed in [2] and the secrecy outage probability was
derived. A general observation in that work was that increasing
the diversity gain of the main channel can effectively reduce
the secrecy outage probability. The single-input single-output
multi-eavesdropper (SISOME) system was considered in [3],
in which a single antenna transmitter communicates with a
single antenna legitimate receiver in the presence of multiple
eavesdroppers equipped with multiple antennas. In [4], trans-
mit antenna selection (TAS) was proposed to provide secure
communication. The proposed scheme consisted of a multiple
antenna transmitter with a single radio frequency (RF) chain,
a single antenna legitimate receiver, and a multiple antenna
eavesdropper. In [5], cooperative jamming was introduced to
confuse the eavesdropper in a multiple-input single-output
(MISO) wiretap channel. By taking into account multiple
antennas at the transceiver, the legitimate receiver, and the
eavesdropper, the secrecy performance of several diversity
combining schemes over independent and correlated fading
1
2channels was investigated in [6] and [7], respectively.
Unfortunately, exploiting multiple colocated antennas to
secure the wireless transmission against eavesdropping and
security attacks would often face the practical constraints
of size and power, especially in small mobile and sensor
terminals. One way around this is cooperative relaying to
achieve spatial diversity using distributed terminals. Several
dual-hop cooperative security schemes have been proposed
and the impact of terminal cooperation on the secrecy rate
was considered [8]–[16]. In particular, the performance of
secure relay networks with different relaying protocols such
as decode-and-forward (DF), amplify-and-forward (AF), and
cooperative jamming was reported in [8], taking into account
relay weights and power allocation. In [9] and [10], several
secure selection schemes for opportunistic relaying were pro-
posed. Relay selection and cooperative jamming was proposed
in [11] and [12] for one-way relaying, and in [13] and [14]
for two-way relaying. A new secrecy transmission protocol
was proposed in [15], where the concept of interference
alignment was combined with cooperative jamming to ensure
that the artificial noise from the transmitters can be aligned
at the destination, but not at the eavesdropper. The impact of
cooperative jamming on MIMO wiretap channels was studied
in [16].
It is important to note that although PHY layer security has
been extensively studied in the open literature for both MIMO
and cooperative communication networks, all previous works
have assumed flat fading channels. In practice, multipath
components are frequently present in wireless communication
systems due to multiple reflectors, in which reflectors cause
a time dispersion and frequency selective fading. If the signal
bandwidth is larger than the frequency coherence bandwidth
or the delay spread is larger than the symbol duration, the
signal is distorted due to intersymbol interference (ISI). To
avoid the use of equalizers in dealing with ISI, single carrier
(SC) transmission is an alternative attractive solution which
uses an increased symbol duration by forming a transmis-
sion block symbol [17], [18], with additional cyclic prefix
(CP) symbols in front of the transmission block symbol.
Thus, compared to orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing
(OFDM) transmission, a block-wise processing is necessary
for CP-SC transmission. There are several existing works and
on-going activities in the context of CP-SC transmission in
several different domains, including non-cooperative systems,
cooperative relaying systems, and spectrum sharing systems,
as follows.
• Non-cooperative systems: Opportunistic scheduling was
proposed in [19] to achieve multiuser diversity. In [20]
and [21], cyclic delay diversity (CDD) was employed
for the frequency-domain equalizer (FDE), whereas dis-
tributed space-frequency block coding was employed
with CP-SC systems [22] to achieve transmit diversity
gain. Several channel estimators for CP-SC systems were
investigated in [23]–[25].
• Cooperative relaying systems: For several relaying pro-
tocols such as DF and AF, as well as project and
forward relaying [26], optimal power allocation [27],
new receiver design [28], optimal training sequences for
channel estimation [29], and best terminal selection [30]
were proposed to enhance the performance.
• Spectrum sharing systems: For cooperative spectrum
sharing [31], [32], and non-cooperative spectrum sharing
[33], CP-SC transmission was proposed considering the
impact of multipath diversity on the system performance,
taking into account several performance indicators such
as outage probability, symbol error rate, and ergodic
capacity.
While the aforementioned literature laid a solid foundation
for the study of CP-SC systems, the PHY layer security
issues with secrecy constraints in CP-SC transmission re-
main unknown. In this paper, to harness the aforementioned
characteristics of multipath components in practice within the
framework of PHY layer security, we focus on secure CP-SC
transmission in DF relay networks. In contrast to the rich body
of literature on PHY layer security, our main contributions are
summarized as follows.
• Frequency selective fading is considered with constraints
of PHY layer security, in which multiple relays and mul-
tiple destinations coexist with a cluster of eavesdroppers.
A two-stage relay and destination selection is proposed
to minimize the eavesdropping and maximize the signal
power of the link between the relay and the destination.
• Analytical results for the secrecy outage probability, the
probability of non-zero achievable secrecy rate, and the
ergodic secrecy rate are derived in closed-form. The
secrecy diversity gain and the secrecy array gain are
calculated based on simplified expressions for the secrecy
outage probability in the high SNR regime. Likewise, the
multiplexing gain and the power cost are calculated based
on simplified expressions for the ergodic secrecy rate in
the high SNR regime.
• It is confirmed that the secrecy diversity gain is directly
determined by the multipath diversity and the multiuser
diversity between the relays and the destinations. The
multiplexing gain is independent of the system and
channel parameters including the number of multipaths,
relays, eavesdroppers, and destinations. Our high SNR
analysis shows that when the average received power
at the eavesdropper is proportional to the counterpart at
the destination, both the secrecy diversity gain and the
secrecy capacity slope collapse to zero, thereby creating
a secrecy outage floor and a secrecy capacity ceiling.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we first detail the system and channel model of the proposed
single carrier systems. In Section III, two-stage relay and des-
tination selection is proposed under a group of eavesdroppers.
Performance analysis of the considered physical system is
presented in Section IV. Simulation results are presented in
Section V and conclusions are drawn in Section VI.
Notation: The superscript (·)H denotes complex conjugate
transposition; IN is an N×N identity matrix; 0 denotes an all-
zeros matrix of appropriate dimensions; CN
(
µ, σ2
)
denotes
the complex Gaussian distribution with the mean µ and the
variance σ2; Cm×n denotes the vector space of all m × n
complex matrices; Fϕ(·) denotes the cumulative distribution
3function (CDF) of the random variable (RV) ϕ; and Ea{·}
denotes expectation with respect to a. The probability density
function (PDF) of ϕ is denoted by fϕ(·); [x]+ = max(x, 0)
and
i∑
l1,...,la
denotes a set of nonnegative integers {l1, . . . , la}
satisfying
a∑
t=1
lt = i.
II. SYSTEM AND CHANNEL MODEL
S
R1
Rk
RK
D1
Dq
DQ
E1
En EN
K relays
Q destinations
N eavesdroppers
k,q
1
k,n
2
Fig. 1. PHY layer security for cooperative single carrier systems.
In the considered system, which is shown in Fig. 1, we
assume the following set of instantaneous impulse channel
responses.
• A set of channels {gk,q, ∀k, q} between a particular
kth relay and the qth destination undergo a frequency
selective fading. They are assumed to have the same
N1 multipath components, i.e., gk,q
△
=[gk,q1 , . . . , g
k,q
N1
]T ∈
CN1×1, each of which is distributed by the complex white
Gaussian distribution with the zero mean and the unit
variance. The path losses over these channels are denoted
by {αk,q1 , ∀k, q}.
• A set of channels {hk,1, . . . ,hk,n, . . . ,hk,N} be-
tween the kth relay and the N eavesdroppers un-
dergo a frequency selective fading. They are assumed
to have the same N2 multipath components, i.e.,
hk,n
△
=[hk,n1 , . . . , h
k,n
N2
]T ∈ CN2×1, each of which is
distributed by the complex white Gaussian distribution
with the zero mean and the unit variance. The path losses
over these channels are denoted by {αk,n2 , ∀k, n}.
• The maximum channel length in the considered system
is assumed to be Ng = max(N1, N2, N3), where N3
denotes the multipath channel length between the source
and relays.
For single-carrier cooperative transmission, we assume that
• Binary phase shift keying (BPSK) modulation is applied
such that P modulated data symbols transmitted by the
source form a transmit symbol block x ∈ CP×1 ∈
{−1, 1}P satisfying Ex{x} = 0 and Ex{xxH} = IP .
• To prevent inter-block symbol interference (IBSI) [17],
[27], [29], the CP comprising of Pg symbols is appended
to the front of x. It is also assume that Pg ≥ Ng.
• We employ the selective-DF relaying protocol, which
selects one relay and destination among their groups.
This selection is accomplished via the proposed two-step
selection scheme.
• We assume perfect decoding at each relay, so that error
propagation does not exist in the considered system 1.
The signal received at the nth eavesdropper from the kth
relay is given by
rk,n =
√
Psα
k,n
2 H
k,nx+ nk,n2 (1)
where Ps is the transmit power and Hk,n is the right circulant
matrix [27], [34] defined by hk,n. Also, we assume that
n
k,n
2 ∼ CN (0, σ
2
nIP ). Since we assume perfect decoding at
all the relays and perfect knowledge of CSI2, channels between
the source and the relays are not taken into account in (1) [10],
[11].
Definition 1: Applying the properties of the right circulant
channel matrix [27], [34], the instantaneous SNR between the
kth relay and the nth eavesdropper is defined as
γk,n2 =
Psα
k,n
2 ‖h
k,n‖2
σ2n
= α˜k,n2 ‖h
k,n‖2 ∼ χ2(2N2, α˜
k,n
2 ) (2)
where α˜k,n2
△
=
Psα
k,n
2
σ2n
, and the CDF and PDF of γk,n2 are,
respectively, given by
Fγk,n2
(x) = 1− e−x/α˜
k,n
2
N2−1∑
l=0
1
l!
( x
α˜k,n2
)l
U(x) and
fγk,n2
(x) =
1
(α˜k,n2 )
N2(N2 − 1)!
xN2−1e−x/α˜
k,n
2 U(x) (3)
where U(x) denotes the discrete unit function.
Now the received signal at the qth destination from the kth
relay is given by
zk,q =
√
Psα
k,q
1 G
k,qx+ nk,q1 (4)
where Gk,q is the right circulant matrix defined by gk,q . Also,
we assume that nk,q1 ∼ CN (0, σ2nIQ). According to Definition
1, the instantaneous SNR of the link between the kth relay
and the qth destination is given by γk,q1 =
Psα
k,q
1 ‖g
k,q‖2
σ2n
=
α˜k,q1 ‖g
k,q‖2 ∼ χ2(2N1, α˜
k,q
1 ), so that the CDF of γ
k,q
1 is
given by
Fγk,q1
(x) = 1− e−x/α˜
k,q
1
N1−1∑
l=0
1
l!
( x
α˜k,q1
)l
U(x). (5)
1Practically, the source and the relays are located in the same cluster
yielding high received SNRs at the DF relays to successfully decode the
messages.
2This assumption is commonly seen in the prior literature [8], [10]. The
CSI of the eavesdropper channels can be obtained in the scenario where
eavesdroppers are active.
4In the sequel, we assume that pathloss components αk,n2 and
αk,q1 are independent of the indices of the relay, eavesdropper,
and destination, so that we have α2 = {αk,n2 , ∀k, n} and α1 =
{αk,q1 , ∀k, q}.
III. RELAY AND DESTINATION SELECTION UNDER A
GROUP OF EAVESDROPPERS
In this section, we shall first propose the two-stage relay and
destination selection procedure, in which a relay is selected to
minimize the worst-case eavesdropping in the eavesdropper
group, to decrease the amount of information that eavesdrop-
pers wiretap. And then, the desired destination is selected from
the chosen relay to have the maximum instantaneous SNR
between them. That is, the relay and destination are chosen
according to the following selection criteria:
stage1 : k∗ = min argk∈[1,K](γ
k,max
2 ) and
stage2 : q∗ = max argq∈[1,Q](γ
k∗,q
1 ) (6)
where γk,max2 denotes the maximum instantaneous SNR
among those of between the kth relay and N eavesdroppers.
In addition, γk
∗,q
1 denotes the maximum instantaneous SNR
between the selected relay and the qth destination. When
Q = 1, the proposed relay and destination selection scheme
becomes somewhat similar to that of [10] (Note that the relay
selection based on maximal secrecy rate was analyzed in
the prior literature such as [10], which brings large system
overhead compared with our proposed scheme.). However, due
to an achievable multiuser diversity, the proposed selection
scheme will result in better secrecy outage probabilities, non-
zero achievable secrecy rates, and ergodic secrecy rates. For
this selection, we use a training symbol which has the same
statistical properties as x, and assume a quasi-stationary
channel during its operation.
Next, the corresponding CDF and PDF for a link from a
particular relay to a group of eavesdroppers will be derived.
We start the derivation for the CDF of γk,max2 , which is given
by
Fγk,max2
(x) =
[
1− e−x/α˜2
N2−1∑
l=0
1
l!
( x
α˜2
)l]N
U(x) (7)
where we assume that channels between a particular relay and
N eavesdroppers are independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.).
Since {γ1,max2 , · · · , γ
K,max
2 } is a set of
i.i.d. continuous random variables, the PDF of
γmin,max2
△
=γk
∗,max
2
△
=min(γ1,max2 , · · · , γ
K,max
2 ) can be
derived in the following lemma.
Lemma 1: For the i.i.d. frequency selective fading channels
between a particular relay and a group of eavesdroppers, the
PDF of γmin,max2 is given by (8) at the top of the next page.
Proof: A proof of this lemma is provided in Appendix
A.
For the i.i.d. frequency selective fading channels between
a particular relay and a group of Q destinations, the CDF of
γk
∗,q∗
1
△
=max(γk
∗,1
1 , ..., γ
k∗,Q
1 ) is given by
F
γk
∗,q∗
1
(x) =
[
1− e−x/α˜1
N1−1∑
l=0
1
l!
( x
α˜1
)l]Q
U(x). (10)
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF THE PHYSICAL SECRECY
SYSTEM
The instantaneous secrecy rate is expressed as [6], [35]
Cs =
1
2
[log2(1 + γ
k∗,q∗
1 )− log2(1 + γ
min,max
2 )]
+ (11)
where log2(1 + γ
k∗,q∗
1 ) is the instantaneous capacity of the
channel between the chosen relay and the selected destination,
whereas log2(1 + γ
min,max
2 ) is the instantaneous capacity
of the wiretap channel between the selected relay and the
eavesdropper group. Having obtained PDFs and CDFs of
SNRs achieved by the two-stage relay and destination selection
scheme, the secrecy outage probability, the probability of non-
zero achievable secrecy rate, and the ergodic secrecy rate will
be derived. Then, an asymptotic analysis of the secrecy outage
probability will be developed to see the asymptotic behavior
of the system.
A. Secrecy Outage Probability
According to [7], the secrecy outage probability for a given
secure rate, R, is given by
Pout = Pr(Cs < R)
=
∫ ∞
0
F
γk
∗,q∗
1
(22R(1 + γ)− 1)fγmin,max2
(γ)dγ.(12)
A closed-form expression of (12) is provided by the following
theorem.
Theorem 1: The secrecy outage probability of the single
carrier system employing the proposed relay selection scheme
in frequency selective fading is given by
Pout = C
∑˜ Q∑
q=0
(
Q
q
)
(−1)qe−
q(JR−1)
α˜1
q∑
w1,...,wN1
q!
w1! . . . wN1 !
1∏N1−1
t=0 (t!(α˜1)
t)wt+1
L˜1∑
p=0
(
L˜1
p
)
(JR − 1)
L˜1−p(JR)
p
(qJR
α˜1
+ β2
)−(p+N˜2)
(p+ N˜2 − 1)! (13)
where JR
△
=22R and L˜1
△
=
∑N1−1
t=0 twt+1.
Proof: A detailed derivation is provided in Appendix B.
To explicitly see the secrecy diversity gain, we provide an
asymptotic expression for (13) in the following theorem.
Theorem 2: The asymptotic secrecy outage probability at a
fixed α˜2 is given by
P∞out
△
= lim
α˜1→∞
Pout = (Gaα˜1)
−QN1 +O
(
(α˜1)
−QN1
) (14)
5fγmin,max2
(x) =
KN
(α˜2)N2(N2 − 1)!
K−1∑
k=0
Nk∑
m=0
N−1∑
j=0
(
K − 1
k
)(
Nk
m
)(
N − 1
j
)
(−1)k+m+j
m∑
v1,...,vN2
j∑
u1,...,uN2
m!
v1! . . . vN2 !
j!
u1! . . . uN2 !
1∏N2−1
t=0 (t!(α˜2)
t)vt+1
1∏N2−1
t=0 (t!(α˜2)
t)ut+1
e−
x(m+j+1)
α˜2 xN2+(
∑N2−1
t=0 tvt+1)+(
∑N2−1
t=0 tut+1)−1
= C
∑˜
e−β2xxN˜2−1U(x) (8)
where C△= KN
(α˜2)N2(N2−1)!
, β2
△
= (m+j+1)α˜2 , N˜2
△
=N2 + (
∑N2−1
t=0 tvt+1) + (
∑N2−1
t=0 tut+1), and∑˜△
=
K−1∑
k=0
Nk∑
m=0
N−1∑
j=0
(
K − 1
k
)(
Nk
m
)(
N − 1
j
)
(−1)k+m+j
m∑
v1,...,vN2
j∑
u1,...,uN2
m!
v1! . . . vN2 !
j!
u1! . . . uN2 !
1∏N2−1
t=0 (t!(α˜2)
t)vt+1
1∏N2−1
t=0 (t!(α˜2)
t)ut+1
. (9)
where the secrecy array gain is given by
Ga =
[ Cˆ
(N1!)Q
∑̂QN1∑
l=0
(
QN1
l
)
(JR − 1)
QN1−l
(JR)
l(α˜2)
l (l + N˜2 − 1)!
(βˆ)l+N˜2
]− 1
QN1 (15)
with Cˆ△= KN(N2−1)! , βˆ
△
=m+ j + 1, and
∑̂
, which is given by
∑̂△
=
K−1∑
k=0
Nk∑
m=0
N−1∑
j=0
(
K − 1
k
)(
Nk
m
)(
N − 1
j
)
(−1)k+m+j
m∑
v1,...,vN2
j∑
u1,...,uN2
m!
v1! . . . vN2 !
j!
u1! . . . uN2!
1∏N2−1
t=0 (t!)
vt+1
1∏N2−1
t=0 (t!)
ut+1
. (16)
Proof: A detailed proof of this theorem is provided in
Appendix C.
This theorem shows that the secrecy diversity gain is QN1,
which is the product of the multipath diversity gain and the
multiuser diversity gain achievable between the selected relay
and the Q destinations.
Corollary 1: When α˜1 → ∞, α˜2 → ∞ with α˜1α˜2 = κ, then
the asymptotic secrecy outage probability is given by
P∞out =
Cˆ
(N1!)Q
∑̂
(κ)QN1(JR)
QN1
(QN1 + N˜2 − 1)!
(βˆ)QN1+N˜2
(17)
which shows that the secrecy diversity gain is not achievable
for this particular case.
B. The probability of non-zero achievable secrecy rate
In the following, we shall derive the probability of non-zero
achievable secrecy rate.
Corollary 2: The probability of non-zero achievable secrecy
rate is provided by (18) at the top of the next page. In (18),
we have defined N˜1
△
=N1+(
∑N1−1
t=0 twt+1)+(
∑N2−1
t=0 tvt+1).
Proof: A proof of this corollary is provided in Appendix
D.
To investigate the effect of the diversity gain on the con-
vergence behavior of the probability of non-zero achievable
secrecy rate to Pr(Cs > 0) = 1, we derive an asymptotic
probability of non-zero achievable secrecy rate. According to
(D.3), the probability of non-zero achievable secrecy rate can
be rewritten as
Pr(Cs > 0) = 1−
∫ ∞
0
F
γk
∗,q∗
1
(x)fγmin,max2
(x)dx. (19)
Substituting (C.1) and (8) into (19), we get the following
asymptotic probability of non-zero achievable secrecy rate
Pr(C∞s > 0) = 1−
C
(N1!)
Q
(
1
α˜1
)N1Q∑˜ (N1Q + N˜2 − 1)!
(β2)
N1Q+N˜2
(20)
which shows that the multipath diversity gain and the multiuser
diversity gain simultaneously affect the convergence speed of
the non-zero achievable secrecy rate to Pr(Cs > 0) = 1. In
the following, we shall derive the ergodic secrecy rate for the
proposed system.
C. Ergodic Secrecy Rate
The ergodic secrecy rate is defined as the instantaneous
secrecy rate Cs averaged over γj
∗,q∗
1 and γ
min,max
2 . As such,
we formulate the ergodic secrecy rate as
C¯s =
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
Csfγk∗,q∗1
(x1) fγmin,max2
(x2)dx1dx2. (21)
Substituting (11) into (21), and applying some algebraic ma-
nipulations, we obtain
C¯s =
1
2 log(2)
∫ ∞
0
Fγmin,max2
(x2)
1 + x2
(
1− F
γk
∗,q∗
1
(x2)
)
dx2.
(22)
6Pr(Cs > 0) = 1−
Q
(α˜1)N1(N1 − 1)!
K∑
k=0
Nk∑
m=0
Q−1∑
q=0
(
Q− 1
q
)(
K
k
)(
Nk
m
)
(−1)q+k+m
m∑
v1,...,vN2
( m!
v1! . . . vN2 !
) q∑
w1,...,wN1
( q!
w1! . . . wN1 !
) 1∏N2−1
t=0 (t!(α˜2)
t)vt+1
1∏N1−1
t=0 (t!(α˜1)
t)wt+1
(m
α˜2
+
q + 1
α˜1
)−N˜1
(N˜1 − 1)!. (18)
Based on the PDF of γmin,max2 given in (8), the CDF of
γmin,max2 is given by
Fγmin,max2
(x) =
∫ x
0
fγmin,max2
(t) dt
= C
∑˜[ (N˜2 − 1)!
(β2)N˜2
− e−β2x
N˜2−1∑
n1=0
(N˜2 − 1)!
n1!
xn1
(β2)N˜2−n1
]
.
(23)
In addition, by employing binomial and multinomial formulas,
the CDF of γk
∗,q∗
1 in (10) can be re-expressed as
F
γk
∗,q∗
1
(x) = 1 +
Q∑
q=1
(
Q
q
)
(−1)qe−qx/α˜1
q∑
w1,...,wN1
q!
w1! . . . wN1 !
xL˜1∏N1−1
t=0
(
t!(α˜1)
t
)wt+1 . (24)
Substituting (23) and (24) into (22), and using the con-
fluent hypergeometric function [36, eq. (9.211.4)] given by
Ψ(α, γ; z) = 1Γ(α)
∫∞
0
e−zttα−1(1 + t)
γ−α−1
dt, we obtain
the ergodic secrecy rate expressed in (25) at the top of the
next page.
In order to gather further insight, we present the asymptotic
ergodic secrecy rate. We first consider the case of α˜1 → ∞
and a fixed α˜2, and provide the following corollary.
Corollary 3: The asymptotic ergodic secrecy rate at α˜1 →
∞ and a fixed α˜2 is given by (26) at the top of the next page.
In (26), ψ (·) is the digamma function [37].
Proof: A proof of this corollary is provided in Appendix
E.
With the help of (26), we confirm that the multiplexing
gain [38] is 1/2 in bits/sec/Hz/(3 dB), which is given by
S∞ = lim
α˜1→∞
C¯∞1
log2 (α˜1)
=
1
2
. (27)
It is indicated from (27) that under these circumstances,
secure communication achieves the same spectral efficiency
as communication without eavesdropping. Moreover, using
(26), we can easily calculate the additional power cost for
different network parameters while maintaining a specified
target ergodic secrecy rate. For example, we consider different
numbers of relays K1 andK2 with K1 > K2. Compared to the
K1 case, the additional power cost in achieving the specified
target ergodic secrecy rate in the K2 scenario is calculated as
∆P (dB) =
10
log 10
[η(K1)− η(K2)] (28)
where
η(K) =
K∑
k=1
Nk∑
m=1
(
K
k
)(
Nk
m
)
(−1)k+m+1
m∑
v1,...,vN2
(
m!
v1! . . . vN2 !
)
Γ(
N2−1∑
t=0
tvt+1 + 1)∏N2−1
t=0 (t!(α˜2)
t
)
vt+1
Ψ(
N2−1∑
t=0
tvt+1 + 1,
N2−1∑
t=0
tvt+1 + 1;m/α˜2).
Similarly, the additional power cost in achieving the specified
target ergodic secrecy rate under different numbers of desti-
nations or eavesdroppers can be accordingly obtained.
We next consider the case of α˜1 → ∞ and α˜2 → ∞ with
α˜1
α˜2
= κ, and provide the following corollary.
Corollary 4: The asymptotic ergodic secrecy rate at α˜1 →
∞ and α˜2 → ∞ with α˜1α˜2 = κ is given by (29) at the top of
the next page.
Proof: A proof of this corollary is provided in Appendix
F.
It is indicated from (29) that a capacity ceiling exists in this
case.
D. The Effects of Multiple Antennas at the Eavesdroppers
We shall investigate the effect of multiple antennas at the
eavesdroppers. Using MRC at each eavesdropper, the received
signal expressed in (1) becomes
rk,n =
√
Psα
k,n
2
M∑
r=1
(H˜k,nr )
HHk,nr x+
M∑
r=1
(H˜k,nr )
Hn
k,n
1 (30)
where Hk,nr is the right circulant matrix formed for a link
from the kth relay to the rth receive antenna branch at the
nth eavesdropper. In the formulation of (30), we assume M
antennas at the each eavesdropper, and αk,n2 is independent of
the antenna branches. In addition, H˜k,nr is the receive matrix
for the rth receive antenna branch at the nth eavesdropper. The
maximum instantaneous post-processing SNR due to MRC,
which is imposes H˜k,nr = Hk,nr , becomes [33]
γk,n,eMRC2 =
Psα
k,n
2
∑M
r=1 ‖h
k,n
r ‖
2
σ2n
. (31)
Comparing to the expression in (2), we can easily see that
γk,n,eMRC2 = α˜
k,n
2
M∑
r=1
‖hk,nr ‖
2 ∼ χ2(2N2M, α˜
k,n
2 ). (32)
7C¯s = −
C
2 log(2)
∑˜ Q∑
q=1
(
Q
q
)
(−1)q
q∑
w1,...,wN1
q!
w1! . . . wN1 !
1∏N1−1
t=0
(
t!(α˜1)
t
)wt+1
(Γ(N˜2)Γ(L˜1 + 1)
(β2)N˜2
Ψ(L˜1 + 1, L˜1 + 1; q/α˜1)−
N˜2−1∑
n1=0
Γ(N˜2)Γ(L˜1 + n1 + 1)
n1!(β2)N˜2−n1
Ψ(L˜1 + n1 + 1, L˜1 + n1 + 1;β2 + q/α˜1)
)
. (25)
C¯∞1 =
1
2
log2(α˜1) +
1
2 log(2)
[ Q
(N1 − 1)!
Q−1∑
q=0
(
Q − 1
q
)
(−1)q
q∑
w1,...,wN1
(
q!
w1! . . . wN1 !
)
1∏N1−1
t=0 (t!)
wt+1
Γ(N1 + L˜1)
(q + 1)N1+L˜1
[ψ(N1 + L˜1)− log(q + 1)] +
K∑
k=1
Nk∑
m=1
(
K
k
)(
Nk
m
)
(−1)k+m+1
m∑
v1,...,vN2
(
m!
v1! . . . vN2 !
)
Γ(
N2−1∑
t=0
tvt+1 + 1)∏N2−1
t=0 (t!(α˜2)
t)
vt+1 Ψ(
N2−1∑
t=0
tvt+1 + 1,
N2−1∑
t=0
tvt+1 + 1;m/α˜2)
]
. (26)
C¯∞2 =
1
2
log2(κ) +
1
2 log (2)
[ Q
(N1 − 1)!
Q−1∑
q=0
(
Q− 1
q
)
(−1)q
q∑
w1,...,wN1
(
q!
w1! . . . wN1 !
)
1∏N1−1
t=0 (t!)
wt+1
Γ(N1 + L˜1)
(q + 1)N1+L˜1
[ψ(N1 + L˜1)− log(q + 1)]− Cˆ
∑̂Γ(N˜2)
(βˆ)N˜2
[ψ(N˜2)− log(βˆ)]
]
. (29)
P eMRCout = C
eMRC
∑˜eMRC Q∑
q=0
(
Q
q
)
(−1)qe−
q(JR−1)
α˜1
q∑
w1,...,wN1
q!
w1! . . . wN1 !
1∏N1−1
t=0 (t!(α˜1)
t)wt+1
L˜1∑
p=0
(
L˜1
p
)
(JR − 1)
L˜1−p(JR)
p
(qJR
α˜1
+ β2
)−(p+N˜eMRC2 )(p+ N˜ eMRC2 − 1)!,
P r(CeMRCs > 0) = 1−
Q
(α˜1)N1(N1 − 1)!
K∑
k=0
Nk∑
m=0
Q−1∑
q=0
(
Q− 1
q
)(
K
k
)(
Nk
m
)
(−1)q+k+m
m∑
v1,...,vMN2
( m!
v1! . . . vMN2 !
) q∑
w1,...,wN1
( q!
w1! . . . wN1 !
) 1∏MN2−1
t=0 (t!(α˜2)
t)vt+1
1∏N1−1
t=0 (t!(α˜1)
t)wt+1
(m
α˜2
+
q + 1
α˜1
)−N˜1
(N˜1 − 1)!, and
C¯eMRCs = −
1
2 log(2)
CeMRC
∑˜eMRC Q∑
q=1
(
Q
q
)
(−1)q
q∑
w1,...,wN1
q!
w1! . . . wN1 !
1∏N1−1
t=0
(
t!(α˜1)
t
)wt+1
[Γ(N˜ eMRC2 )Γ(L˜1 + 1)
(β2)
N˜eMRC2
Ψ(L˜1 + 1, L˜1 + 1; q/α˜1)−
N˜eMRC2 −1∑
n1=0
Γ(N˜ eMRC2 )Γ(L˜1 + n1 + 1)
n1!(β2)
N˜eMRC2 −n1
Ψ(L˜1 + n1 + 1, L˜1 + n1 + 1;β2 + q/α˜1)
]
. (33)
8Using the statistical properties of γk,n,eMRC2 , the performance
metrics, such as the secrecy outage probability, the probability
of non-zero achievable secrecy rate, and the ergodic secrecy
rate can be derived. Their corresponding expressions are given
by (33) at the bottom of the previous page. In (33), we
have defined CeMRC△=C
∣∣
N2→MN2
,
∑˜eMRC△
=
∑˜∣∣∣
N2→MN2
,
and N˜ eMRC2
△
=MN2 + (
∑MN2−1
t=0 tvt+1) + (
∑MN2−1
t=0 tut+1).
Corollary 5: The multiple antennas employed in the form
of MRC at each eavesdropper do not influence the secrecy
diversity gain. They can only change the secrecy array gain.
Proof: According to Theorem 2, the asymptotic secrecy
outage probability at a fixed α˜2 is given by
P∞,eMRCout = (G
eMRC
a α˜1)
−QN1 +O((α˜1)
−QN1) (34)
where
GeMRCa =
[ CˆeMRC
(N1!)Q
∑̂eMRC QN1∑
l=0
(
QN1
l
)
(JR − 1)
QN1−l
(JR)
l(α˜2)
l (l + N˜
eMRC
2 − 1)!
(βˆ)l+N˜
eMRC
2
]− 1
QN1 (35)
with CˆeMRC△=Cˆ
∣∣
N2→MN2
and
∑̂eMRC△
=
∑̂∣∣∣
N2→MN2
, where
Cˆ and
∑̂
are specified in (16). From (34), we can readily see
that MRC at the each eavesdropper does not affect the secrecy
diversity gain.
Corollary 6: The multiple antennas employed in the form of
MRC at the eavesdroppers do not influence the multiplexing
gain. They can only change the additional power cost for a
specified target ergodic secrecy rate.
Proof: According to Corollary 3, the asymptotic ergodic
secrecy rate at a fixed α˜2 is given by only interchanging
the parameter N2 → MN2. From (27), we see that the
multiplexing gain is still 1/2, and MRC at the eavesdroppers
impacts the additional power cost as shown in (28).
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
For the simulations, we use BPSK modulation. The trans-
mission block size is formed by 64 BPSK symbols. The
CP length is given by 16 BPSK symbols. Every channel
vectors are generated by hk,n ∼ CN(0, IN2), ∀k, n and
gk,q ∼ CN(0, IN1), ∀k, q. The curves obtained via actual link
simulations are denoted by Ex, whereas analytically derived
curves are denoted by An. Asymptotically obtained curves are
denoted by As in the following figures.
A. Secrecy Outage Probability
Figs. 2-4 show the secrecy outage probability for various
scenarios. Fig. 2 shows the secrecy outage probability for
various values of N1 at fixed values of (K = 4, N = 2, N2 =
3, Q = 1,M = 1, R = 1) and α˜2 = 5 dB. As Theorem
2 proves, a lower secrecy outage probability is achieved by
a bigger value of N1. In this particular scenario, the secrecy
diversity gain becomes N1. We can see exact matches between
the analytically derived curves and the simulation obtained
curves for the outage probability. Fig. 3 shows the secrecy
outage probability for various values of Q andM at fixed value
of (K = 4, N = 2, N1 = 3, N2 = 2, R = 1) and α˜2 = 5 dB.
We can observe the effect of the multiuser diversity gain on
the secrecy outage probability. As Q increases, a lower secrecy
outage probability is obtained due to the multiuser diversity.
We can also observe the effect of multiple antennas at the
eavesdroppers. For the same channel length and the number of
destinations, for example, (N1 = 3, N2 = 2, Q = 1,M = 1)
has a 3 dB gain over (N1 = 3, N2 = 2, Q = 1,M = 2)
at 1 × 10−3 outage probability. Similar behavior can be
observed as M becomes larger. Moreover, it can be seen
that N , the number of eavesdroppers, does not change the
secrecy diversity gain. Fig. 4 verifies the derived asymptotic
secrecy outage probability at a fixed α˜2. As α˜1 increases, the
asymptotic curves approaches the simulation obtained curves
for various values of N1, Q, andM . From these curves, we can
see that the secrecy diversity gain is N1Q, which is determined
by the multipath diversity gain, N1, and the multiuser diversity
gain,Q. It is irrespective of M . A similar overall diversity gain
is obtained in [27], which does not consider eavesdroppers.
B. The Non-Zero achievable Secrecy Rate
Fig. 5 illustrates the non-zero achievable secrecy rate for
various values of N1, M , and Q. At fixed (K = 4, N = 2) and
α˜2 = 5 dB, this figure shows that (N1 = 2,M = 2, Q = 1)
has the slowest convergence speed arriving at Pr(Cmin >
0) = 0.999 due to the smallest achievable diversity gain and
the value of M . Although (N1 = 2,M = 2, Q = 1) has the
same diversity gain as (N1 = 2,M = 1, Q = 1), its conver-
gence speed is slowest due to greater eavesdropping capability
of eavesdroppers. If we compare two particular scenarios, such
as (N1 = 2,M = 2, Q = 1) and (N1 = 3,M = 2, Q = 1),
then the multipath diversity is seen to be one of the key factor
in determining the convergence speed, whereas by comparing
(N1 = 2,M = 2, Q = 1) with (N1 = 2,M = 2, Q = 2),
we can see that the multiuser diversity is another key factor in
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Fig. 2. Secrecy outage probability for various values of N1 at fixed values
of (N2 = 3, R = 1) and α˜2 = 5 dB.
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Fig. 3. Secrecy outage probability for various values of Q and M at fixed
values of (N1 = 3, N2 = 2, R = 1) and α˜2 = 5 dB.
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Fig. 4. Asymptotic secrecy outage probability for various values of N1, Q,
and M at fixed values of (N2 = 3, R = 1) and α˜2 = 5 dB.
determining the convergence speed of the non-zero achievable
secrecy rate.
C. The Ergodic Secrecy Rate
In Fig. 6, we first compare the derived ergodic secrecy rate
with the simulation obtained ergodic secrecy rate for the case
of (N1 = 3, N2 = 2,M = 1, Q = 4). We assume a fixed
number of eavesdroppers (N = 3) and a single relay (K = 1).
Perfect matchings between them can be observed. From this
figure, we can compare several scenarios to investigate the
effects from the system configurations and channels.
• The effect of eavesdropping: More eavesdropping reduces
the ergodic secrecy rate. For example, (N1 = 3, N2 =
2,M = 2, Q = 4) vs. (N1 = 3, N2 = 2,M = 1, Q = 4).
• The effect of multipath diversity which is achievable
between the relay and the destination: Higher multipath
diversity gain results in a higher ergodic secrecy rate.
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Fig. 5. Non-zero achievable secrecy rate for various values of N1, M , and
Q at fixed values of N2 = 2 and α˜2 = 5 dB.
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Fig. 6. Ergodic secrecy rate for various values of (K,N1, N2,M,Q).
For example, (N1 = 3, N2 = 2,M = 2, Q = 2) vs.
(N1 = 2, N2 = 2,M = 2, Q = 2).
• The effect of number of destinations: With more desti-
nations, a higher ergodic secrecy rate can be obtained
due to a larger multiuser diversity gain. For example,
(N1 = 2, N2 = 2,M = 2, Q = 4) vs. (N1 = 2, N2 =
2,M = 2, Q = 2).
• The effect of fixed α˜2: As Corollary 4 verified, capacity
ceilings are intrinsic for this case.
In Fig. 7, we show the asymptotic ergodic secrecy rate for
various values of (K,N1, N2,M,Q) at a fixed number of
eavesdroppers N = 3 and α˜2. This plot shows the correspond-
ing asymptotic ergodic secrecy rate obtained from Corollary 3.
As α˜1 increases, the differences between the analytical ergodic
secrecy rates and the asymptotic ergodic secrecy rates are
negligible. We can also easily see that the multipath diversity
and the multiuser diversity are two key factors in determining
the ergodic secrecy rates. According to (28), a total of five
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Fig. 7. Ergodic secrecy rate for various values of N1 and Q at fixed values
of (K = 4, N = 2) and α˜2 = 1 dB.
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Fig. 8. Multiplexing gain S∞.
relays can reduce 0.8 dB power than a single relay in achieving
2.0 secrecy rate. Fig. 8 shows the multiplexing gain S∞
as a function of (K,N1, Q), which are the key system and
channel parameters in determining the diversity gain. As α˜1
increases, the multiplexing gain S∞ approaches 1/2. Since a
larger diversity has a more influence from the second term
in the right hand side of (26), the convergence speed to 1/2
becomes slower as the diversity gain increases.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed cooperative single carrier
systems with multiple relays and destinations. A coexisting
group of eavesdroppers have been assumed to eavesdrop the
relays. For this challenging environment, we have proposed
a two-stage relay and destination selection scheme: 1) relay
is selected to minimize the worst-case eavesdropping, and 2)
the desired destination is selected to achieve the multiuser
diversity gain. We have derived the secrecy outage probability,
the non-zero secrecy rate, and the ergodic secrecy rate. From
the derivations and the link simulations, the diversity gain
has been shown to be determined by the multipath diversity
gain and the multiuser diversity gain. Having derived the
asymptotic ergodic secrecy rate, the multiplexing gain has been
shown to be equal to the number of hops.
APPENDIX A: A DETAILED DERIVATION OF LEMMA 1
According to the order statistics, the PDF of γmin,max2 is
given by
fγmin,max2
(x) = K(1− Fγk,max2
(x))K−1fγk,max2
(x). (A.1)
Binomial and multinomial formulas provide the following
expression for fγk,max2 (x):
fγk,max2
(x) =
N
(α˜2)N2(N2 − 1)!
N−1∑
j=0
(
N − 1
j
)
(−1)je−
x(j+1)
α˜2
j∑
u1,...,uN2
( j!
u1! . . . uN2 !
) xN2+∑N2−1t=0 tut+1−1∏N2−1
t=0 (t!(α˜2)
t)ut+1
. (A.2)
Again binomial and multinomial formulas lead us to get the
following expression for (1 − Fγk,max2 (x))
K−1:
(1− Fγk,max2
(x))K−1
=
[
1−
(
1− e−x/α˜2
N2−1∑
l=0
1
l!
( x
α˜2
)l)N]K−1
=
K−1∑
k=0
(
K − 1
k
)
(−1)k
(
1− e−x/α˜2
N2−1∑
l=0
1
l!
( x
α˜2
)l)kN
=
K−1∑
k=0
(
K − 1
k
)
(−1)k
Nk∑
m=0
(
Nk
m
)
(−1)me−mx/α˜2
(N2−1∑
l=0
1
l!
( x
α˜2
)l)m
=
K−1∑
k=0
(
K − 1
k
)
(−1)k
Nk∑
m=0
(
Nk
m
)
(−1)me−mx/α˜2
m∑
v1,...,vN2
( m!
v1! . . . vN2 !
) x∑N2−1t=0 tvt+1∏N2−1
t=0 (t!(α˜2)
t)vt+1
. (A.3)
Multiplying (A.2) and (A.3) and after some manipulations,
yields (8).
APPENDIX B: A DETAILED DERIVATION OF THEOREM 1
Now substituting fγmin,max2 (γ), which is derived in (8) and
F
γk
∗,q∗
1
(γ), which is derived in (5) into (12), we have (B.1)
at the top of the next page. Using multinomial and binomial
formulas, J1 becomes
J1 =
q∑
w1,...,wN1
q!
w1! . . . wN1 !
1∏N1−1
t=0 (t!(α˜1)
t)wt+1
L˜1∑
p=0
(
L˜1
p
)
(JR − 1)
L˜1−p(JR)
pγp. (B.2)
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Pout =
∫ ∞
0
[
1− e−(JR−1+JRγ)/α˜1
N1−1∑
l=0
1
l!
((JR − 1 + JRγ)
α˜1
)l]Q
fγmin,max2
(γ)dγ
=
Q∑
q=0
(
Q
q
)
(−1)q
∫ ∞
0
e−q(JR−1+JRγ)/α˜1
[N1−1∑
l=0
1
l!
( (JR − 1 + JRγ)
α˜1
)l]q
︸ ︷︷ ︸
J1
fγmin,max2
(γ)dγ. (B.1)
Substituting (B.2) into (B.1), yields
Pout =
Q∑
q=0
(
Q
q
)
(−1)qe−
q(JR−1)
α˜1
q∑
w1,...,wN1
q!
w1! . . . wN1 !∑L˜1
p=0
(
L˜1
p
)
(JR − 1)L˜1−p(JR)p∏N1−1
t=0 (t!(α˜1)
t)wt+1∫ ∞
0
e−qJRγ/α˜1γpfγmin,max2
(γ)dγ. (B.3)
Again using (8) into (B.3), we have (B.4) at the top of the
next page which proves (13).
APPENDIX C: A DETAILED DERIVATION OF THEOREM 2
Applying the Taylor series expansion truncated to the N1th
order given by ex =
N1∑
l=0
xl
l! +O(x
N1), we derive the first order
expansion of F
γk
∗,q∗
1
(x), which is specified in (5), at high α˜1
as
F
γk
∗,q∗
1
(x)
=
[
1− e−x/α˜1
(
ex/α˜1 −
1
N1!
( x
α˜1
)N1
−O((
x
α˜1
)N1
)
)
]Q
=
1
(N1!)Q
(
x
α˜1
)QN1
+O((α˜1)
−QN1). (C.1)
In addition, the PDF expression fγmin,max2 (x) in (8) needs tobe written as
fγmin,max2
(x) = Cˆ
∑̂ xN˜2−1
(α˜2)N˜2
e−
βˆx
α˜2 U(x). (C.2)
Substituting (C.1) and (C.2) into (12), the asymptotic secrecy
outage probability is calculated as (C.3) at the top of the next
page which proves (15).
APPENDIX D: A DETAILED DERIVATION OF COROLLARY 1
The CDF of γmin,max2 is given by
Fγmin,max2
(x)
= 1− (1− Fγk,max2
(x))K
= 1−
K∑
k=0
Nk∑
m=0
(
K
k
)(
Nk
m
)
(−1)k+me−mx/α˜2
m∑
v1,...,vN2
( m!
v1! . . . vN2 !
) x∑N2−1t=0 tvt+1∏N2−1
t=0 (t!(α˜2)
t)vt+1
. (D.1)
In addition, the PDF of γk
∗,q∗
1 is given by
f
γk
∗,q∗
1
(x) =
Q
(α˜1)N1(N1 − 1)!
Q−1∑
q=0
(
Q− 1
q
)
(−1)q
q∑
w1,...,wN1
( q!
w1! . . . wN1 !
) 1∏N1−1
t=0 (t!(α˜1)
t)wt+1
xN1+
∑N1−1
t=0 twt+1−1e−
x(q+1)
α˜1 U(x). (D.2)
The probability of non-zero achievable secrecy rate is given
by
Pr(Cs > 0)
=
∫ ∞
0
Fγmin,max2
(x)f
γk
∗,q∗
1
(x)dx
= 1−
Q
(α˜1)N1(N1 − 1)!
K∑
k=0
Nk∑
m=0
Q−1∑
q=0
(
Q− 1
q
)(
K
k
)(
Nk
m
)
(−1)q+k+m
m∑
v1,...,vN2
( m!
v1! . . . vN2 !
) q∑
w1,...,wN1
( q!
w1! . . . wN1 !
)
1∏N2−1
t=0 (t!(α˜2)
t)vt+1
1∏N1−1
t=0 (t!(α˜1)
t)wt+1∫ ∞
0
e−x(
m
α˜2
+ q+1
α˜1
)xN˜1−1dx (D.3)
which becomes (18).
APPENDIX E: A DETAILED DERIVATION OF COROLLARY 3
Based on (D.1), we first rewrite the CDF of γmin,max2 as
Fγmin,max2
(x) = 1 + F˜γmin,max2
(x), (E.1)
where
F˜γmin,max2
(x) =
K∑
k=1
Nk∑
m=1
(
K
k
)(
Nk
m
)
(−1)k+m+1e−mx/α˜2
m∑
v1,...,vN2
( m!
v1! . . . vN2 !
) x∑N2−1t=0 tvt+1∏N2−1
t=0 (t!(α˜2)
t)vt+1
.
Then, the ergodic secrecy rate is derived as (E.2) at the top of
the next page. As α˜1 →∞, Θ1 asymptotically becomes
Θ∞1 =
∫ ∞
0
[
log (α˜1) + log
(
x1
α˜1
)]
f
γk
∗,q∗
1
(x1) dx1
= log (α˜1) +
∫ ∞
0
log
(
x1
α˜1
)
f
γk
∗,q∗
1
(x1) dx1. (E.3)
Substituting the PDF of γk
∗,q∗
1 given in (D.2) into
(E.3), and employing [36, eq. 4.352.1] given by
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Pout = C
∑˜ Q∑
q=0
(
Q
q
)
(−1)qe−
q(JR−1)
α˜1
q∑
w1,...,wN1
q!
w1! . . . wN1 !
∑L˜1
p=0
(
L˜1
p
)
(JR − 1)L˜1−p(JR)p∏N1−1
t=0 (t!(α˜1)
t)wt+1∫ ∞
0
e
−γ
(
qJR
α˜1
+β2
)
γp+N˜2−1dγ
= C
∑˜ Q∑
q=0
(
Q
q
)
(−1)qe−
q(JR−1)
α˜1
q∑
w1,...,wN1
q!
w1! . . . wN1 !
1∏N1−1
t=0 (t!(α˜1)
t)wt+1
L˜1∑
p=0
(
L˜1
p
)
(JR − 1)
L˜1−p(JR)
p
(qJR
α˜1
+ β2
)−(p+N˜2)
(p+ N˜2 − 1)!. (B.4)
P∞out =
Cˆ
(N1!)Q
∑̂∫ ∞
0
(JRγ + JR − 1
α˜1
)QN1 γN˜2−1
(α˜2)N˜2
e−
βˆγ
α˜2 dγ +O((α˜1)
−QN1)
=
Cˆ
(N1!)Q
∑̂QN1∑
l=0
(
N1
l
)( 1
α˜1
)QN1
(JR − 1)
QN1−l(JR)
l
∫ ∞
0
γl
γN˜2−1(
α˜1
)N˜2 e− βˆγα˜2 dγ+
O((α˜1)
−QN1)
=
C
(N1!)Q
∑̂QN1∑
l=0
(
QN1
l
)( 1
α˜1
)QN1
(JR − 1)
QN1−l(JR)
l(α˜2)
l (l + N˜2 − 1)!
(βˆ)l+N˜2
+O
(
(α˜1)
−QN1
)
= (Gaα˜1)
−QN1 +O((α˜1)
−QN1). (C.3)
C¯s =
1
2 log(2)
∫ ∞
0
[∫ x1
0
Fγmin,max2
(x2)
1 + x2
dx2
]
f
γk
∗,q∗
1
(x1) dx1
=
1
2 log(2)
[ ∫ ∞
0
log(1 + x1)fγk∗,q∗1
(x1)dx1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Θ1
+
∫ ∞
0
∫ x1
0
F˜γmin,max2
(x2)
1 + x2
f
γk
∗,q∗
1
(x1)dx2dx1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Θ2
]
. (E.2)
∫∞
0
xν−1e−µx log (x) dx = 1µν Γ (ν)
[
ψ (ν)− log (µ)
]
,
we compute (E.3) as
Θ∞1 = log(α˜1) +
Q
(N1 − 1)!
Q−1∑
q=0
(
Q− 1
q
)
(−1)q
q∑
w1,...,wN1
(
q!
w1! . . . wN1 !
)
1∏N1−1
t=0 (t!)
wt+1
Γ(N1 + L˜1)
(q + 1)N1+L˜1
[
ψ(N1 + L˜1)− log(q + 1)
]
. (E.4)
Changing the order of integration in Θ2, we have
Θ2 =
∫ ∞
0
F˜γmin,max2
(x2)
1 + x2
(1− F
γk
∗,q∗
1
(x2))dx2. (E.5)
According to the first order expansion of the CDF of γk
∗,q∗
1
shown in (C.1), as α˜1 → ∞, Fγk∗,q∗1 (x2) ≈ 0. Hence, the
asymptotic expression for Θ2 is given by
Θ∞2 =
∫ ∞
0
F˜γmin,max2
(x2)
1 + x2
dx2
=
K∑
k=1
Nk∑
m=1
(
K
k
)(
Nk
m
)
(−1)k+m+1
m∑
v1,...,vN2
(
m!
v1! . . . vN2 !
)
1∏N2−1
t=0 (t!(α˜2)
t
)vt+1
∫ ∞
0
e−mx2/α˜2x2
∑N2−1
t=0 tvt+1
1 + x2
dx2
=
K∑
k=1
Nk∑
m=1
(
K
k
)(
Nk
m
)
(−1)k+m+1
m∑
v1,...,vN2
(
m!
v1! . . . vN2 !
)
Γ(
N2−1∑
t=0
tvt+1 + 1)∏N2−1
t=0 (t!(α˜2)
t
)
vt+1
Ψ(
N2−1∑
t=0
tvt+1 + 1,
N2−1∑
t=0
tvt+1 + 1;m/α˜2). (E.6)
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Substituting (E.6) and (E.4) into (E.2), we derive the asymp-
totic expression for the ergodic secrecy capacity as (26).
APPENDIX F: A DETAILED DERIVATION OF COROLLARY 4
In the case of α˜1 → ∞ and α˜2 → ∞ with α˜1α˜2 = κ, the
asymptotic ergodic secrecy rate can be easily obtained based
on the proof of Corollary 3 in Appendix E. We only need to
further provide an asymptotic expression for Θ∞2 with α˜2 →
∞. Observing Θ∞1 in (E.3), an asymptotic expression for Θ∞2
can be derived as
Θ∞21 = − log (α˜2)−
∫ ∞
0
log
(
x2
α˜2
)
fγmin,max2
(x2) dx2. (F.1)
Substituting the PDF of γmin,max2 in (8) into (F.1), we obtain
Θ∞21 = − log (α˜2)− Cˆ
∑̂∫ ∞
0
e−βˆxxN˜2−1 log(x2)dx2
= − log(α˜2)− Cˆ
∑̂Γ(N˜2)
(βˆ)N˜2
[ψ(N˜2)− log(βˆ)]. (F.2)
Substituting the new asymptotic expression for Θ∞2 in (F.2)
and (E.4) into (E.2), we get (29).
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